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In the Opponent’s Shoes: Increasing the Behavioral Validity
of Attackers’ Judgments in Counterterrorism Models
Sumitra Sri Bhashyam1,∗ and Gilberto Montibeller2
Akey objective for policymakers and analysts dealing with terrorist threats is trying to predict
the actions that malicious agents may take. A recent trend in counterterrorism risk analysis
is to model the terrorists’ judgments, as these will guide their choices of such actions. The
standard assumptions in most of these models are that terrorists are fully rational, following
all the normative desiderata required for rational choices, such as having a set of constant
and ordered preferences, being able to perform a cost-benefit analysis of their alternatives,
among many others. However, are such assumptions reasonable from a behavioral perspec-
tive? In this article, we analyze the types of assumptions made across various counterterror-
ism analytical models that represent malicious agents’ judgments and discuss their suitability
from a descriptive point of view. We then suggest how some of these assumptions could be
modified to describe terrorists’ preferences more accurately, by drawing knowledge from the
fields of behavioral decision research, politics, philosophy of choice, public choice, and con-
flict management in terrorism. Such insight, we hope, might help make the assumptions of
these models more behaviorally valid for counterterrorism risk analysis.
KEY WORDS: Behavioral validity; counterterrorism risk analysis; terrorist decision making; terrorist
judgments
1. INTRODUCTION
Counterterrorism risk analysis is growing in
importance both in terms of research(1,2) and
practice.(3,4) The field comprises models that assume
terrorist attacks are random events, as well as adver-
sarial models in which the risks are caused by ma-
licious agents who want to take purposeful actions
against their enemies.(1,2,5–13)
A recent trend in counterterrorism analysis is to
model terrorists’ judgments,(1,12,14) as these will guide
their choice of action, targets, or attack mode. These
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models are based on several assumptions about how
terrorists make decisions and their judgments and,
typically, assume that the attacker is fully rational.
However, are such assumptions reasonable from a
behavioral perspective?
In this article, we analyze the types of as-
sumptions made across various counterterrorism
analytical models that represent malicious agents’
judgments and discuss their suitability from a be-
havioral point of view, by drawing knowledge from
the fields of behavioral decision analysis, psychol-
ogy, politics, philosophy of choice, public choice,
and conflict management in terrorism. We believe
counterterrorism models that represent attackers’
judgments could be better informed by empirical
findings from these fields. The behavioral evidence
we found suggests that terrorists are neither fully
rational (“homo economicus”) nor irrational—they
have instead bounded rationality.(15) We thus make
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several suggestions as to how these assumptions
might be adapted so terrorist judgments could be
represented in a behaviorally more accurate way
in adversarial models, increasing their descriptive
validity. For the purpose of our analysis, and in
common with most adversarial models, we consider
the terrorist organization as a single decisionmaker,
which seems to be a reasonable assumption given
the military style of hierarchy in this context.(16,17)
This article is composed of the following sec-
tions. We first provide a short overview of the key
methods used in the context of counterterrorism
modeling when judgments of terrorists are being rep-
resented, the focus of this article, and discuss the
main assumptions concerning attackers’ judgments
that are made in such models. We then discuss the
validity of these assumptions in relation to the type
of decisionmaker we face, show the considerations
to be made when modeling decisions of a terrorist,
and suggest changes that can make the models be-
haviorally more valid. We conclude the article by
suggesting some avenues for further research on this
theme.
2. MODELING UNCERTAINTIES
AND DECISIONS
In this section, we review the main approaches
to modeling threats caused by terrorism and, subse-
quently, discuss the assumptions they make regard-
ing the attacker’s judgments. These approaches can
be broadly classified under two modeling categories:
uncertainties (regarding an attacker’s decision, capa-
bility, and success, and defender’s success) and de-
cisions (based on the preferences of the defender
and attacker). Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) relies
heavily on modeling uncertainties, using expert elic-
itation to capture the probabilities associated with
them. Game theory (GT), on the other hand, relies
on modeling a situation based on the decisions of
the players, making the assumptions that both actors
are rational. As adversarial risk analysis (ARA) com-
bines both approaches, it needs to make assumptions
in both categories.
2.1. Main Modeling Methods in Counterterrorism
Analysis
PRA in the context of terrorism threats aims
to model the situations and decisions from the per-
spective of the defender’s preferences. The attack-
ers’ choices are indirectly represented by deriving a
ranking of risks, that is, a ranking of the attacks ter-
rorists might potentially employ.(5,8,13,14,18,19) The pa-
rameters representing risks are subjective judgments
elicited by experts.(20,21)
A recent trend in modeling terrorism using a
decision analytical approach includes the use of de-
cision trees (DTs) and influence diagrams (IDs)
to model decisions from the point of view of the
attacker.(1,12,14) In this case, the attackers’ pref-
erences are estimated in order to try to infer
their favored attacks.(1) Multi-attribute utility models
(MAUT)(22) have also been proposed in this context,
with the definition of terrorists’ value models.(12,14)
GT has been extensively researched in the con-
text of terrorism in an attempt to capture the in-
teractions between the defender and the attacker,
a feature that is difficult to do using PRA.(23–25) In
this case, the attacker’s consequences are maximized
in the context of resource-allocation decisions for
the protection of potential targets,(6,23,24,26) and of
hostage situations and negotiation analysis.(27–29) For
an excellent review on the development in games in
the context of terrorism, see Sandler and Siqueira(30)
and Kardes.(31)
To capture the benefits of both PRA and GT ap-
proaches, ARA has recently been suggested. It at-
tempts to capture the risk associated with the attacks,
as well as the preferences of both the defender and
the attackers.(10,11,32)
2.2. Key Modeling Assumptions in
Counterterrorism Analysis Models
In the context of counterterrorism analysis, PRA
analytical tools and other modeling methods, includ-
ing DTs and GTs, make similar assumptions regard-
ing the attackers’ judgments. These can be catego-
rized into three themes described next.
2.2.1. Assumption 1: Attackers are Rational
In models that represent terrorists’ decisions
(such as GT and modeling DTs or IDs from the point
of view of the attacker), the issue of the rationality
of the decisionmaker arises. Following the standard
models of decisions under uncertainty, agents are as-
sumed in these models to be rational decisionmakers
who maximize expected utility.(33) The assumption is
thus of substantive rationality, in which the behavior
is adequate given the desire to achieve a given set of
goals.(34)
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Under this premise, and provided that an agent
satisfies Savage’s axioms of rationality,(35) his/her
choices can be represented using expected utility the-
ory (EUT). In this case, mono- or multi-attribute util-
ity theory(22) can be used to model the utility of an
agent’s choice. This requires the knowledge of the
set of objectives the agent is trying to achieve, and in
these models, this set is assumed to remain the same
throughout time.
2.2.2. Assumption 2: Attackers are Consequentialists
Modeling terrorist decision making using GT,
ARA, or DT from the terrorists’ perspective requires
risk analysts to infer which consequences the ter-
rorists are trying to optimize, given the assumption
made about substantive rationality. Typically, these
consequences are assumed to be costs, damage and
propaganda,(6) costs and fatalities,(13) or economic
costs.(8)
To capture the lack of knowledge about the at-
tacker’s preferences, GT has been adapted to ac-
count for incomplete information regarding one of
the players. In cases where probability distributions
from different players are not consistent, multiple
utilities can be used in the game.(36) In GT mod-
els of asymmetric information, knowledge is updated
throughout the game.(28,37)
2.2.3. Assumption 3: Attackers Assess
the Situation Objectively
PRA relies heavily on the availability of intelli-
gence data as well as expert knowledge to assess the
parameters involved in the models. These are, for in-
stance, the likelihood of the attacker’s success given
a particular strike, and the defender’s success in pre-
venting it.(1,5,8,9,13) These assessments require the as-
sumption that terrorists view the world objectively,
for example, that his/her perception of the proba-
bilities of achieving success or the utility of conse-
quences in reaching a target are not biased.(1)
Therefore counterterrorism models make as-
sumptions regarding the rationality of attackers and
the way that the latter make their choices, the conse-
quences that they are concerned with, and the prob-
abilities of events that they consider.
Are these three key assumptions realistic from
a descriptive perspective? This is what we discuss in
the next section.
3. VALIDITY OF ASSUMPTIONS—
IMPLICATIONS FORMODELING
TERRORISM DECISION MAKING
Counterterrorism models can provide interest-
ing insight as to what a rational player might do,
in other words, the solution observed in such mod-
els (preferred modes of attack, chosen targets, etc.)
arises from a normative view rather than a descrip-
tive one.(1)
Extensive behavioral decision research(38–40) has
demonstrated that decisionmakers can suffer from
various cognitive and motivational biases (see Mon-
tibeller and von Winterfeldt for a comprehensive
review);(41) these can be induced by external influ-
ences, such as the availability of data, but can also
be influenced by the state of mind in which the agent
finds himself.
In the following subsections, we will thus first dis-
cuss the descriptive validity of each key assumption
made and, subsequently, suggest how they can be ad-
justed to increase the behavioral validity of attackers’
judgments in counterterrorism modeling.
3.1. Are Terrorists Rational Decisionmakers?
Can terrorists be considered as rational decision-
makers, or homo economicus? Terrorists’ rationality
may be questioned from an economic point of view
for several reasons. Their choice of actions may not
always be directed to achieving the best outcome in
terms of their long-term objectives, that is, political
benefits.(42) Furthermore, their chosen targets may
not always be those providing the optimal outcome
given terrorists’ set of objectives.(17,43)
Such inconsistencies in decision making have led
people to think that terrorists might be irrational
in their choice of actions, but research has argued
otherwise.(44,45) An important aspect in considering
terrorist decisionmakers concerns the type of terror-
ists we face. Caplan(44) classifies them into three cate-
gories (sympathizers, active, and suicidal terrorists),3
each one having different attitudes that we discuss
in the paragraphs that follow. As different types of
terrorists behave slightly differently, knowing which
one we are dealing with can give us an indication
of the type of rational behavior we can expect from
them. We thus can analyze terrorists’ rationality us-
ing these categories, and consider three standards of
3Although this classification is well-established in the literature,
other more specific terrorist classifications have also been pro-
posed (e.g., Victoroff (45)).
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a rational decisionmaker as a homo economicus: re-
sponsiveness to incentives, narrow self-interest, and
rational expectations.
3.1.1. Do Terrorists Respond to Incentives?
Terrorists are observed to have a negatively
sloped demand curve, in other words, riskier tactics
are used only if they are more effective.(46,47) The
view that terrorists will make tradeoffs between costs
and political benefits is supported by empirical ev-
idence. Indeed, their choice of targets, their strate-
gies, and tactics are made using careful evaluations
of economic costs, risks, time, and likelihood of suc-
cess. They have also been seen to be strategic in vary-
ing the levels of risk in their “portfolio” of attacks,
and choose an offensive strategy that both minimizes
resources and maximizes damage and probability of
success.(11,48–52)
Furthermore, terrorists are versatile in their
choices; in other words, they can adapt rapidly to
changes in the environment. For instance, they have
been seen to change targets quickly if security had
been tightened at an original chosen target.(49,51,53)
One can argue that suicidal tactics, for instance,
can be considered as rational from an economic per-
spective, as they are quite cost effective in terms of
aimed casualties and lives claimed. On average, a
Palestinian suicide strike costs USD150; compared
to other strikes worldwide it achieves four times
as many deaths, and over six times as many in Is-
rael (and 26 times more victims). Furthermore, these
strikes are observed mostly when there are no other
viable alternatives.(46,47)
3.1.2. Do Terrorists Pursue Narrow Self-Interest?
Another characteristic of a rational decision-
maker is that he or she is narrowly self-interested,
that is, will not engage in actions in which he or she
is entirely disinterested. Here the questions relate to
the rationality of terrorists for engaging in such costly
behavior to gain little or nothing in return. With re-
gard to sympathizers, as Caplan(44) argues, we can
safely make the assumption of narrow self-interest.
However, in the case of active and suicidal terrorists,
this assumption may be less straightforward.
It must be noted that the concept of narrow
self-interest has been criticized for its validity, as
the evaluation of the act goes beyond the quality of
the consequence; rather, a decisionmaker may judge
the value of the act by the rules of behavior or the
meaning of the act itself.(54) If we thus relaxed this
somewhat rigid assumption of narrow self-interest,
we could still consider active and suicidal terrorists
as rational under this condition. Indeed, interviews
of failed suicidal terrorists revealed that their rea-
sons for this sacrifice lie in the cause they serve, and
not because of the benefits their family would have
received.(55) This also suggests that in the case of
suicidal terrorists, the agents value their cause more
than their lives, and hence evaluate the consequences
of the act according to the cause rather than the con-
sequence to themselves.
3.1.3. Do Terrorists Have Rational Expectations?
Another consideration that we can make about
terrorists is whether their expectations are rational,
that is, when actors make assessments that are re-
alistic and unbiased. In other words, the assessed
values should average around the true value of the
variable.(33)
From this perspective, terrorists’ rationality is of-
ten questioned because of the beliefs they have. For
instance, with Islamic terrorism, the sacrifice of a
male suicide bomber would lead him to obtain life in
paradise in the company of 72 virgins, so the length
of life on earth, compared to that in Paradise, is
negligible.(56)
Caplan,(44) however, argues that we need to look
further, as this argument does not suffice to justify
terrorists’ rationality. What proof do terrorists have
that they would gain such a thing? One proposition
suggested is a model of rational irrationality,(44,57)
whereby there is an additional and less evident ben-
efit in holding expectations that are evidently against
their long-term advantage. Caplan(44) proposes this
benefit could be a psychological one, such as giving
people a “sense of meaning and personal identity.”
In this way, if the costs of holding the expectation
and the benefits gained from holding these expec-
tations are balanced, one can view this choice as a
rational cost-benefit analysis. In other words, “peo-
ple genuinely embrace irrational beliefs, but remain
rational enough to adjust their convictions when the
cost of irrationality has a spike.”(44, p. 101)
In fact, interviews with failed Palestinian suici-
dal terrorists provide some psychological insight into
what might drive terrorists to sacrifice their lives.(55)
In their majority, the failed terrorists had two main
traits: susceptibility to social influence and people
of authority; and subclinical suicidal characteristics,
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some due to depression or post-traumatic stress syn-
drome (PTSD). To some extent, these traits can ex-
plain their self-destructive acts. However, we note
that even though suicide can in fact be a rational
response in desperate situations, Merari et al.’s re-
search shows that suicide terrorists may not be driven
to suicide by such situations. Their study suggests
that although suicidal propensity could be a con-
tributing factor in a significant minority of suicidal
terrorists, it appears that such terrorists’ motivations
and background factors are different from those of
ordinary individuals choosing this path.(55)
The failed suicidal terrorists were characterized
with “a narrow perspective and a constricted experi-
ence of reality. They have fewer available resources
for planning and implementing deliberate strategies
of coping with decision making, and they are more
likely to show inept and ineffective ways to cope with
ordinary experience of daily living.” Furthermore,
they are seen to have a dependent and avoidant per-
sonality style, which distinguishes them from other
types of active terrorists. Such personalities tend to
internalize their anger and other emotions, making
them more prone to becoming martyrs. Their low
self-esteem makes them look for interpersonal rela-
tionships, guidance, and care. In contrast, other types
of active terrorists were impulsive and emotionally
unstable; a personality style more prone to external-
izing their emotions.(55)
As terrorists operate in groups, McCormick(43)
argues that it might be necessary to view their
decisions as the product of organizational decision
making to understand their decisions. Although ter-
rorists will, similarly to organizations, use heuristics
to evaluate options and outcomes to make their deci-
sions, they do so to the extreme. Research has found
a high proportion of terrorists relying on processes of
externalization and splitting to a greater extent than
normal.(16,58) This is a psychological process affecting
behavior that occurs when different mental struc-
tures (such as affect, cognition, or perception) are
disconnected or split off from consciousness. As such,
good and bad traits/aspects of a person/situation are
not fully integrated, resulting in a black and white
view of an individual/the world.(59–61) Individuals ex-
hibiting personality types such as these tend to have
a grandiose and idealized view of themselves, and
because of an inability to cope with their weaknesses
or flaws, project these hated parts onto others. Sim-
ilarly, such individuals will then seek outward for the
source of issues, for example, search for an enemy to
blame.(62) This then distorts their view of themselves,
their enemy, and hence the way they will evaluate
their options and the resulting outcomes.(43) Next,
we suggest some modeling implications in relaxing
the standards of rationality for the different types of
terrorists.
3.1.4. Relaxing the Assumption of Rationality
Although we can safely assume sympathizers be-
have according to the three standards of a rational
decisionmaker, these standards may need to be re-
laxed for the active and suicidal terrorists, as we sug-
gest below.
3.1.4.1. Consider terrorists’ responsiveness
to incentives. As discussed in the previous section,
the three types of terrorists (sympathizers, active,
and suicidal) are considered to respond to incentives.
Such behavior can enable risk analysts to better
infer the probability of a particular strike being
selected (if using DTs from the defender’s view), or
the attractiveness of a certain strike based on how
risky the environment is in a particular location. We
can then make the assumption that if in a certain
location, a strike S has an efficiency e and a level
of risk r , it will be preferred to a strike S′, with
efficiency e′ and a level of risk r ′ if e > e′ and r ≤ r ′.
3.1.4.2. Consider terrorists’ self-interest. A
rational decisionmaker will not engage in actions in
which he/she is entirely disinterested. Although it
is safe to assume that sympathizers act according to
narrow self-interest principles, the case of active and
suicidal terrorists requires some adjustments to be
made.
The question in the case of these two latter types
of terrorists is what benefits they value in their behav-
ior. Therefore, risk analysts may gain a better under-
standing of what benefits the attacker might obtain
from being an active terrorist. These types of terror-
ists evaluate the consequences of their act according
to the cause they serve rather than the consequences
to themselves. One way to reflect this could be by as-
signing a relatively higher weight to objectives relat-
ing to the benefits to the cause resulting from the act
than to the cost to the terrorist’s life. For instance,
as Woo suggested, terrorists might prioritize targets
well known in the Middle East, more so if they are
generally given media publicity.(63)
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3.1.4.3. Consider terrorists’ rational expectations.
Active terrorists may be close to adhering to the stan-
dard of rational expectation. Even though the ma-
licious agent might choose to have irrational expec-
tations (some that are devoid of evidence, for in-
stance), they would not have such beliefs if they did
not gain some sort of benefits from them. Active ter-
rorists are impulsive, emotionally unstable, and are
prone to externalize their emotions.(55) Acting out
their anger could therefore be a benefit that justifies
the cost of engaging in terrorism. Should the costs
of having these beliefs become too high, one might
expect them to modify their thoughts on the matter.
Consequently, this is likely to have an impact on the
utility functions as well as the probability of a strike
being chosen. Therefore, when describing the utility
of active terrorists, modelers could incorporate the
benefit gained from externalizing their anger.
Suicidal terrorists, however, do not seem to have
rational expectations.(44) Even as the cost rises, some
suicidal terrorists will choose to carry on and die
rather than reevaluate their beliefs, as observed by
the research carried out by Merari et al.,(55) who in-
terviewed failed suicidal terrorists. Therefore, it may
be useful for risk analysts to have an understanding
of the benefits that suicidal terrorists seek from such
an act. The psychological benefits can explain suici-
dal terrorists’ willingness to participate in such a self-
destructive act. Their personality type makes them
seek care and guidance from stronger personality fig-
ures. The benefit they seek when becoming martyrs
or victims is the attention they would get from it. The
utilities describing what suicidal terrorists may gain
from engaging in terrorism would benefit from incor-
porating this element.
If we, therefore, posit that terrorists can be con-
sidered as rational actors who will maximize a utility,
the question remains as to what consequences they
are trying to maximize, which we discuss next.
3.2. Do Terrorists Choose Their Actions to Achieve
Desired Consequences?
In this section, we discuss the validity of the dom-
inant view relating to terrorists being politically mo-
tivated and having clear objectives. We subsequently
present some suggestions regarding the elements to
include when modeling the utility of a terrorist. In
particular, we suggest that while wemight still be able
to posit that terrorists are consequentialists, there is
evidence that they care about other objectives than
only economic or political ones, which affect how the
targets are assessed and chosen.
3.2.1. Do Models Represent the Consequence
that Terrorists Really Want to Achieve?
One assumption made in decision models relates
to the ability of decisionmakers to clearly identify
and formulate a set of relevant objectives they want
to achieve and against which they will evaluate their
alternatives. To some extent, it is reasonable to make
this assumption in the terrorism context. As men-
tioned before, terrorists have been seen to choose
attacks that offer the best compromise between the
operational aspects, such as costs and feasibility, and
the benefits gained from the strike.(11,49–52) Further-
more, the psychological study conducted by Merari
et al.(55) revealed that the organizers had high coping
resources, which enabled them to plan strategically.
However, various terrorismmodels of preferences do
not consider all the objectives terrorists might take
into account. In addition, we argue that terrorists’
preferences may not remain static, which we discuss
in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.2. Do Terrorists Only Seek to Achieve
Political Gains?
As previously discussed, the view that terrorists
will make tradeoffs between costs and political bene-
fits is supported by empirical evidence. Targets and
strikes are carefully chosen to balance costs, risks,
time, and likelihood of success.(11,49–52) For this rea-
son, the dominant view suggests that terrorists are
political utility maximizers.(42) Formally, terrorism
becomes an attractive form of protest when the polit-
ical benefits gained by terrorism outweigh the costs,
but this does not always seem to be the case.(17)
Could it be then that terrorism is a means to
achieving something quite different? If some of the
terrorists’ actions lead us to doubt their rationality
because it goes against their political goals, maybe it
could be that certain objectives important to terror-
ism have not been considered.
In addition to the political benefits, Abrahms(17)
also points out other benefits to take into account,
which are not related to political ones. Indeed, indi-
viduals seem to want to belong to a terrorist group
for the social aspect of it. This can explain why, even
though beneficial to them politically, terrorists are re-
luctant to participate in peaceful or democratic nego-
tiations.
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Research shows that terrorist organizations ap-
peal to certain kinds of individuals for reasons that
are rarely political, and if they are, are of mi-
nor importance. As discussed previously, terrorism
seems particularly attractive to certain psychological
types.(16,45,58) Demographic research also shows that
terrorist organizations are mostly composed of indi-
viduals not integrated into society for various rea-
sons (from being unmarried to being widowed or
unemployed).(17,64–66) Empirical research shows that
terrorist members are 10 times more likely to have
joined for the social bonds resulting from joining a
group than for the ideology of that group.(67) Further
evidence shows that the political goals of the orga-
nization are rarely known by its members, whether
they are foot soldiers or leaders.(68)
Therefore, one objective modelers may need
to take into account is maximizing the viability of
terrorist units. As Abrahms(17) highlights, “terror-
ist organizations behave more as social solidarity
maximizers than as political maximizers.” To our
knowledge, most counterterrorism decision models
do not consider these objectives.
3.2.3. Do Terrorists’ Preferences Remain Static
Over Time?
Individuals are subject to preference change due
to two main different sources: endogenous and ex-
ogenous. The first one arises when the utility of a
consumption depends on the past consumptions, that
is, someone’s tastes today are influenced by what has
been “tasted” previously.(69,70) Sources of exogenous
preference change include emotions and visceral fac-
tors, which we focus on here.(71)
However, counterterrorism analysis usually dis-
regards the temporal dimension of decisions and
its effects on preferences. For instance, the design
of most decision analytical models, such as that of
Rosoff and John,(12) considers the terrorists’ values,
preferences, and utilities as static; they do not ac-
count for potential changes in objectives, or fluctu-
ations in beliefs over time. These changes can occur
for various reasons, such as changes in the environ-
ment or leadership.
Terrorists’ motivations include a reaction to an
event. Therefore, an understanding of which objec-
tives terrorists might want to maximize at a given
moment requires an appreciation of the state of
the environment, and the recent actions from the
defender.(71)
3.2.4. Considering Terrorists’ Objectives
We now suggest several aspects that risk analy-
sis may want to consider when modeling terrorists’
objectives.
3.2.4.1. Avoid oversimplifying value models. In
the evaluation of homeland security decisions,
Keeney and vonWinterfeldt(7) focus on twomain ob-
jectives, namely, minimizing both the loss of lives and
the costs of the decisions when evaluating policies.
This assumes terrorists would only consider a strike
based on these two objectives, but is that an adequate
representation of how terrorists would evaluate ob-
jectives? Evidence suggests that terrorists often have
a broader set of objectives to achieve.(17,55,68)
A strong assumption in several models, espe-
cially in game-theoretical ones, is that objectives
are diametrically opposed, which is not necessarily
always the case. Each side may have additional
objectives that the other side may not consider. For
instance, Pate´-Cornell and Guikema(32) evaluate
various types of strikes based on the symbolism of
the attack, the amount of destruction done, and the
extent of political destabilization caused. Even as
this helps simplify the model and discover interesting
solutions, terrorists may consider other objectives,
such as causing panic, as we mentioned previously.
3.2.4.2. Extend the objectives against which
strikes are evaluated. Based on the variety of at-
tacks used by terrorists, we argue that the objectives
generally used in counterterrorism models may not
always be sufficient from a descriptive point of view.
Consider the case of the Anthrax attack in 2001, for
instance. The strike did not cause many casualties
(five deaths) relative to other types of attacks. How-
ever, a widespread panic, nationwide disrupted mail
delivery, as well as costs of USD 1 billion resulted
from the strike.(72) More recently, the shutdown of
Boston following the marathon bombing is estimated
to have cost around USD 1 billion.(73)
According to Richardson(68) and Kydd and
Walter,(74) the benefits sought by terrorism can be
grouped into the following categories: revenge by
causing damage in terms of loss of human lives and
economic losses; renown by the delivery of a sym-
bolic message through which they want to be rec-
ognized as being powerful to promote media cover-
age and recruitment; and reaction such as achieving a
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Table I. Terrorists’ Additional Means-Ends Objectives (Adapted
from Abrahms(48))
Ends Means
1. Prolong their
existence
Using strategies that instead of
promoting policy concessions from
the defender, harden their reluctance
to make them. Lack of success even
for a prolonged length of time does
not make the group give up and
disband. They create new issues to
remain relevant when their political
aims are no longer actual.
2. Ensure their
continued viability
Avoiding to peacefully engage in
democratic processes.
3. Avoid disbanding Often rejecting negotiated settlements
even though they offer substantial
policy concessions.
4. Guarantee their
survival
Adopting unstable political goals that
can never be completely fulfilled.
5. Avert organization-
threatening
reprisals
Conducting anonymous attacks, even
though they preclude the possibility
of coercing policy concessions.
6. Remain
competitive
Eradicate competitive terrorist
organization with identical ideologies
that competes for members,
regardless of the adverse effect it
might have on their political cause.
regime change, territorial change, policy change, so-
cial control, or maintaining the status quo.
Abrahms(17) suggests that additional benefits to
those of political ones need to be taken into ac-
count, which are summarized in Table I. Although
trying to use tactics to gain a political change, such
as engaging in collaborations between organizations
to fund their objectives,(74) terrorists’ strategies will
also include an element that will ensure their exis-
tence is continued and justified. This can mean resist-
ing participation in negotiations, or rejecting them.
Some of their goals, and means to achieve them,
can be detrimental to their cause, such as remaining
competitive through destroying competing terrorism
groups.
When building adversarial models, risk analysts
thus may need to devote more effort to understand-
ing the objectives that drive the terrorism organiza-
tion if they want to increase the descriptive validity
of their models. Some research on what drives terror-
ism already exists; however, it has been focused on
the political goals, and not the social or psychological
ones.(42,52,74) While determining what sites to protect
against certain types of strikes may be something that
is always necessary, the fight against terrorism also
needs to try to tackle the issue at its origin: the attrac-
tiveness of belonging to a terrorist organization itself.
Understanding the latter could provide a basis for de-
vising counterterrorism aimed at depleting terrorist
organizations of their members, and slowing their re-
cruitment. Research has found that individuals gain a
sense of belonging, success, heroism, and pride.(16,17)
Interviews of terrorists by Post et al.(16, p. 194) have re-
vealed a fusion between the individual and the orga-
nization whereby “[i]f the group succeeded, then as
an individual they succeeded; if the group failed, they
failed. Pride and shame as expressed by the individ-
ual were reflections of the group actions, not individ-
ual actions, feelings or experiences.” Therefore, this
suggests that it could be beneficial to direct efforts to-
ward ensuring they gain feelings of shame from their
attacks rather than pride from broadcasting their
terror efforts.
3.3. Are Terrorists Normative Decisionmakers?
Counterterrorism models often make the as-
sumptions that terrorists will decide normatively,
that is, as an idealized decisionmaker with infinite
mental abilities who is rational and consistent in
his/her choices. This excludes the various descriptive
elements real-world decisionmakers are usually sub-
ject to, such as inconsistent values, the effect of stress,
or their inability to keep track of or compute large
amounts of information.(75)
In DTs andGT in particular, further assumptions
are made concerning attackers’ utility functions and
their probabilities assigned to consequences.(11) But
when evaluating the consequences of alternatives
and likelihood of outcomes, decisionmakers are sub-
ject to two main factors: bounded rationality,(15,34)
which may cause violation of some normative ax-
ioms, and the effect of emotions. Both of them are
discussed in this section.
3.3.1. Do Terrorists Make Estimates Accurately?
The uncertainties that terrorists face, and that
are most often modeled, are the probabilities of
acquiring the material required to perform a strike
and the success of such strike. Questions arise as to
whether terrorists are able to estimate accurately the
probability of being detected and their strike being
prevented, as well as the degree to which their strike
might be successful. This requires modelers to make
further assumptions as to the extent of terrorists’
knowledge regarding the defensive capabilities of
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the defenders. However, assuming this was the case,
do they have the ability to estimate the required
probabilities involved in complex attacks?(1) We
have not found direct evidence about terrorism, but
the extensive literature about behavioral biases on
the estimations of probability of success, as well as of
consequences of alternatives, suggests they probably
suffer from the same cognitive and motivational
biases as regular decisionmakers do (e.g., overcon-
fidence, anchoring, desirability)(41) and therefore
may overestimate the probabilities of success in their
acts.
3.3.2. Do Visceral Factors Influence Terrorist
Decision Making?
In addition to cognitive and motivational biases,
the effect of passions or visceral factors (such as
anger and fear) might need to be taken into ac-
count when considering terrorism decision making.
For instance, according to Merari et al.,(55) suicide
bombers and their organizers are especially prone to
the influence of emotions. Because of the strength
of these emotions and the state into which they put
the individual, they cause a temporary change of be-
havior. Similarly, Post(16, p. 25) suggests that terrorists
“are driven to commit acts of violence as a con-
sequence of psychological forces. In addition, their
special psycho-logic is constructed to rationalize acts
they are psychologically compelled to commit. Indi-
viduals are drawn to the path of terrorism in order to
commit acts of violence.” His interviews of 35 incar-
ceratedMiddle Eastern terrorists revealed that anger
and hatred without remorse were often conveyed.(67)
Miller(77) also proposes that terrorist motivation can
be organized into a three-stage process whereby un-
acceptable conditions in the environment trigger re-
sentment by the sense of injustice induced, which
eventually leads them to find the enemy to be the in-
justice personified.
Passions, visceral factors, and negative emotions
also have an impact on the way agents evaluate prob-
abilities, their risk attitude, and the way they view
performances of options.(78) The effects of passions
and visceral factors can be categorized into four main
streams. Because cognition is temporarily distorted,
decisionmakers’ evaluation of an outcome’s proba-
bility or the outcome itself is altered. Furthermore,
they may become blind to certain consequences, and
look only at consequences made salient by the pas-
sions. Decisionmakers’ will is altered and weakened
such that options with worse outcomes than others
are chosen.
These effects also have implications for the way
in which modelers evaluate how decisionmakers dis-
count time. Indeed, if the deliberative system evalu-
ates equally long- and short-term consequences, the
affective system will put a much greater emphasis
on short-term outcomes.(78) Passions and visceral fac-
tors influence an agent to behave extremely myopi-
cally and to seek immediate rewards, disregarding
any detrimental effects, such as the effects observed
in addiction. In the context of terrorism, although at-
tackers are known for their long-term strategic plan-
ning and patience,(53) myopic behavior can also be
observed. Myopic discounting is especially observed
in the case of suicide bombers or self-martyrs.(55)
Furthermore, there is evidence that negative af-
fective states may influence decision making in vari-
ous ways, including altering the agent’s decision pro-
cess, or shaping the agent’s motives. It has been
suggested that distinct states may lead to differ-
ent influences.(79–84) For instance, research on the
impact of sexual arousal and decision making has
demonstrated the importance of situational forces on
preferences, which are influenced by the emotional
state.(85,86) Similarly, research suggests that certain
emotional states, such as sadness or anxiety, in-
duce biases favoring different types of attributes. Al-
though anxious individuals would favor low-risk/low-
reward options, sad individuals are biased in favor of
high-risk/high-reward options.(87)
3.3.3. Considering Terrorists’ Evaluation
of Alternatives and Uncertainties
We believe there are two main elements having
an effect on the assessments of options that are worth
considering to increase the behavioral validity of ad-
versarial models, as these can provide some insights
into the estimates of how terrorists might score op-
tions: the impact that emotions and visceral factors
have, as well as the impact of time on terrorists’ pref-
erences. Our suggestions are classified into four main
categories described below.
3.3.3.1. Consider terrorists as myopic decision-
makers. Given the visceral factors terrorists might
be experiencing, empirical research supports that
they would have the tendency to prioritize short-term
objectives rather than long-term ones.(88,89) Conse-
quently, models could heavily discount time (notice
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that organizations on the defender’s side might also
be myopic in making decisions).(90) In MAUT mod-
els, which represent both short- and long-term objec-
tives, a much heavier weight could be allocated to the
short-term objectives than one would expect to as-
sign in circumstances where the agents would not be
subject to strong emotions.
3.3.3.2. Consider that terrorists have an altered
view of objectives. The emotional impact will cause
certain objectives to be relatively more important
in terrorists’ minds, and might result in several
other objectives being omitted from a multiobjec-
tive function.(88) The objectives made more salient
due to visceral factors are not always rational. In
other words, the consequences arising from fulfilling
these objectives can be detrimental to the agent—
as observed in the case of road rage.(89,91) Allocat-
ing more weight—or perhaps all weight in some ex-
treme cases—to some of the objectives less geared
towards achieving their political gain and more to-
ward the “social aspect” of the terrorist organization
may capture this behavior. The social objectives as-
sociated with terrorism are summarized in Table I.
Modeling causal relationships can also help in
providing an insight into the prioritization of ob-
jectives. Certain modeling tools, such as system dy-
namics, provide the platform to evolve with time
or gain an insight into the directions towards which
distinct variables might be moving. An attempt at
capturing dynamic weights in the context of terror-
ism was made by Sri Bhashyam and Montibeller.(92)
However, GT or DTs would need to be updated
accordingly, which could be done using Bayesian
updating.(32)
3.3.3.3. Consider terrorists’ risk attitude. Vis-
ceral factors have a strong impact on the assessment
of the performance of alternatives, risk attitudes, and
the assessments of probabilities. Empirical research
shows that emotions have a nonnegligible impact
on the judgment of risk.(79,80,82,83,93) Fear in partic-
ular influences risk assessments by inflating them,
whereas anger does the opposite. In addition, fear
induces risk-averse choices, whereas the opposite is
observed with anger.(81–83) Admittedly, identifying
whether terrorists are attacking under fear or anger
might be difficult in practice.
In general, based on the empirical evidence, it is
reasonable to assume that terrorists will be affected
by anger during the planning of a strike.(55,67,77)
Therefore, a more precautionary approach by the
risk analyst, at the planning stage of a terrorist attack,
would be to assume a risk-seeking behavior of ter-
rorists (instead of the usual linear assumption where,
for instance, each death, or financial/media impact
is worth the same). However, during the execution
phase of a terrorist attack, where the “foot soldiers”
are involved in performing the strike, it might be
worthwhile for the modeler to consider a risk-averse
attitude of attackers, which could be caused by fear
The level of emotion experienced by terrorists
could be represented by the steepness of the util-
ity function; the stronger the emotion experienced,
the steeper the utility function. Furthermore, the
shape of the utility function depends on the type of
emotion experienced. A terrorist experiencing fear
would have a concave utility function for gains (risk
aversion); in contrast, a terrorist experiencing anger
would have a convex utility function for gains (risk
proneness).
3.3.3.4. Consider terrorists’ biased estimates.
When incorporating probabilistic assessment from
the point of view of the terrorists, risk analysts might
consider that decisionmakers are often prone to
biased assessments. As highlighted earlier, visceral
factors can worsen the effects further, thus the
performance of alternatives and risk assessments is
bound to be altered.
Hence, terrorists’ state of mind could be con-
sidered when assessing the performance of certain
strikes and their likelihood of success from their
point of view. In particular, we suggest that the
inferred judgments made by terrorists could be
adjusted as follows to reflect the impact of vis-
ceral factors. Terrorists under the influence of fear
(suicidal terrorists, for example) will tend to be
more pessimistic,(82,83) hence the probabilities of
success of a strike, and the probabilities of the risk
they encounter, could be scored lower and higher,
respectively. However, terrorists under the influence
of anger (sympathizers or active terrorists) will tend
to be more optimistic;(82,83) thus, the probabilities
of success of a strike, or the probabilities of the risk
they encounter, could be scored higher and lower
accordingly.
In Table II, we summarize the key modeling con-
siderations we have made throughout the article and
how they can be addressed to improve the descriptive
validity of attackers’ judgments.
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Table II. Modeling Considerations and Implications for Representing Terrorists’ Judgments
Modeling Considerations Implications for Modeling Terrorists’ Judgments
Responding to incentives Findings: Actions taken by the defender can have an impact on the actions the attacker will
take. Sympathizers, active, and suicidal terrorists all respond to incentives. This means that if
measures are taken to strengthen the security against one type of strike, hence increasing the
risk of terrorists being caught, the attractiveness of this strike will diminish. As a result, other
strikes will be perceived as more attractive.(49,51,53)
Suggestions: This causal variation in the attractiveness of strikes caused by the effect of the
defender might be captured by updating the partial utilities of the relevant strikes.
Terrorists and narrow
selfishness
Findings: A rational decisionmaker will not engage in actions in which he or she is
disinterested. The question in the case of active and suicidal terrorists is what benefit they
value in their behavior, as such terrorists evaluate the consequences of their act according to
the cause they serve rather than the consequences to themselves.(44,55)
Suggestions: One way to reflect this is by assigning a relatively higher weight to objectives
relating to the benefits to the cause resulting from the act than to the weight assigned the
terrorist’s life. See examples of benefits described in Table I.
Terrorists and rational
expectations
Findings: This area concerns whether terrorists’ expectations are rational. Active terrorists
behave as social solidarity maximizers, rather than political maximizers, and seek to prolong
the viability of the units for the social benefits they provide. Suicidal terrorists’ behavior can
be considered rational if the utility gained from being a martyr in terms of care and attention
received is included.(17,44,55,57)
Suggestions: In DTs (from the perspective of the terrorists), GT, or ARA models, when
representing decisions of active terrorists:
 Include the social benefits involved with terrorism (for instance, those described in
Table I).
 Include the psychological benefits of violence; these are means to act out their
emotions (anger).
However, when modeling decisions of suicidal terrorists:
 Include the utility gained from taking the status of martyr or victim. These are means
to gain attention.
Time discounting Finding: Terrorists can be considered as myopic decisionmakers.(88,89)
Suggestions: Modelers may represent such behavior by:
 Assigning greater relative weight to short-term objectives to reflect that these are
prioritized over long-term ones.
 Omitting, in certain extreme cases, long-term objectives, such as gaining political
concessions.
Altered view of objectives Findings: Visceral factors cloud judgment; certain objectives, even self-destructive ones, are
prioritized.(88,89,91)
Suggestions: Analysts may assign a greater relative weight to objectives contributing to prolong
the existence of the terrorist organization.
Utility functions: risk
attitudes
Findings: Visceral factors affect risk attitudes in the following way:(79–83,93)
 Fear renders agents to be risk-averse.
 Anger renders agents to be risk-seeking.
Suggestions:
 When dealing with terrorists prone to fear (for instance, suicidal terrorists), consider
their utility function might have a steeper concave shape.
 When dealing with terrorists prone to anger (for instance, active terrorists and terrorist
leaders), consider their utility function could have a steeper convex shape.
(Continued)
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Table II. (Continued)
Modeling Considerations Implications for Modeling Terrorists’ Judgments
Biased estimates Findings: Visceral factors affect risk assessments in the following way: (36,77,78)
 Fear makes agents more pessimistic and hence lowers their perception of being in
control or successful.
 Anger makes agents more optimistic as they have a higher perception of being in
control.
Suggestions:
 When dealing with terrorists prone to fear (for instance, suicidal terrorists), analysts
may use a lower perceived probability of success.
 When dealing with terrorists prone to anger (for instance, active terrorists and terrorist
leaders) analysts may use a higher perceived probability of success.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
An important trend in counterterrorism analysis
is the modeling of attackers’ judgments as a way of
inferring their choices of targets or modes of oper-
ation. The vast majority of models suggested in this
field consider the attacker as a fully rational homo
economicus.
We argued in this article that it might be also
useful to better understand how terrorists’ judgments
are developed from a descriptive perspective. We
analyzed three key assumptions commonly made in
counterterrorism risk analytic models: that terror-
ists are rational decisionmakers, that they are conse-
quentialists, and that they make estimates in an ob-
jective way. For each assumption we drew evidence
from a wide variety of sources and suggested ways
that they could be adjusted in such models.
We hope these suggestions prove useful for en-
riching adversarial models and for further supporting
counterterrorism decision aiding. However, it is an
open question whether models that are descriptively
valid could provide better predictive power to terror-
ists’ actions than those ones that assume full rational-
ity (a similar debate has been raging in economics for
decades without a definitive conclusion).
In addition, we recognize that many of the sug-
gestions made here are tentative and need further
development. Furthermore, the evidence we used,
despite our best efforts, was mainly from indirect
sources, given the inherent difficulties in getting ac-
cess to the enemy. In addition, similarly to most
papers in adversarial risk analysis, we assumed that
the terrorist organization is an individual decision-
maker, but recognize that more complex organiza-
tional relationships exist in practice.
There are several interesting directions of re-
search in this field, three of which we now suggest.
First, the development of protocols for eliciting those
descriptive parameters required in counterterrorism
risk models from counterterrorist experts. This is not
a trivial task, as experts would need to place them-
selves in the “opponent’s shoes.” Second, the com-
parison of results between models that employ a fully
rational model against those that are behaviorally
valid, assessing to which extent they differ and their
predictive power, is needed. Third, a behavioral de-
cision research agenda for counterterrorism analysis
would be welcome, which could provide a better un-
derstanding of the cognitive and motivational biases
affecting terrorists and, in particular, of the role of
emotions on their decision making.
Concluding, we hope that this article helps in
pointing out directions that can make counterterror-
ism models represent in a more accurate way the
judgments of attackers. The increase in behavioral
validity would provide richer results and, hopefully,
models with better predictive power.
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